I study the growth and welfare e¤ects of integration in a world economy populated by global oligopolists. For economies that move from autarky to trade, I show that growth and welfare rise because exit of domestic …rms is more than compensated by entry of foreign …rms so that integration generates a larger, more competitive market where …rms have access to a larger body of technological spillovers that support faster growth. The e¤ects of a gradual reduction of barriers to trade -a global reduction in tari¤s -are di¤erent because economies start out from a situation where all …rms already serve all markets. In this case, integration brings about a reduction of the global number of …rms so that the variety of consumption goods and the diversity of innovation paths fall. The surviving …rms, on the other hand, are larger and exploit static and dynamic economies of scale to a larger degree. These homogeneization and rationalization e¤ects work in opposite directions. Under plausible conditions, the rationalization e¤ect dominates and growth and welfare rise.
Introduction
In the last …fty years the world has become more integrated as institutional and technological changes have lowered barriers to the mobility of goods, capital and people. This process of globalization a¤ects individual economies through several mechanisms. A very powerful one is industrial restructuring, that is, the change in market structure that occurs as a result of entry/exit of …rms. In this paper, I discuss a model where industrial restructuring entails exit of domestic …rms and ask whether such a change in market structure is bene…cial for growth and welfare. 1 For economies that move from autarky to trade -free or restricted by tari¤s -I show that integration raises growth and welfare because exit of domestic …rms is more than compensated by entry of foreign …rms. In other words, the fact that domestic consumers and producers gain access to foreign goods and knowledge means that integration generates a larger, more competitive market where …rms have access to a more diverse body of technological spillovers that supports faster growth. The growth e¤ect is larger the less competitive the economy is before integration, while it is negligible for economies that are very competitive to begin with. The e¤ects of a gradual reduction of barriers to trade -a global reduction in tari¤s -are di¤erent because economies start out from a situation where all …rms already serve all markets. Hence, the reduction of barriers to trade makes all markets more competitive, in the sense that in each country domestic producers are less protected, and thereby triggers a reduction in the global number of …rms. In other words, in each country consumers see a reduction of the variety of available goods and producers see a reduction of the diversity of spillovers sources. In this case, there is a tension between internal and external increasing returns. The reduction of the global number of …rms means that the variety of consumption goods and the diversity of innovation paths fall. I call this the homogenization e¤ect. On the other hand, the surviving …rms are larger and exploit static and dynamic economies of scale to a larger degree. I call this the rationalization e¤ect. A global reduction in tari¤s raises growth and welfare if the rationalization e¤ect dominates.
Two aspects of my analysis are worth emphasizing. First, the notion that openness to foreign competition drives domestic …rms out of business is accepted by most people. What is not often accepted, however, is that the bene…ts dominate the costs. An exception is the rationalization argument due to Eastman and Stykolt (1960) , and formalized by Dixit and Norman (1980) and Horstman and Markusen (1986) , that protection leads to excessive entry and thus prevents …rms from achieving an e¢cient size. Horstman and Markusen wrote partially in response to Venables (1985) , who argued that protection can raise national welfare in the context of a homogeneous good model where markets are segmented, and showed that his results depended crucially on the assumption of segmented markets. Venables (1987) , in turn, pointed out that the di¤erence between segmented and integrated markets is irrelevant in a di¤erentiated products model and showed that the bene…ts from protection stem from the fact that it raises the share of the market for di¤erentiated goods that domestic …rms capture. This paper provides a generalization of these arguments to a framework where the number of …rms and …rm size -which are jointly determined and thus interdependent -a¤ect economic growth. Moreover, it looks at the general equilibrium e¤ects for the global economy of multilateral actions -like the global reduction in tari¤s due to the GATT -as opposed to focusing on unilateral trade policy. The framework takes into account several features of real-world industry and does not produce counterfactual predictions, like a linear scale e¤ect, that make previous analyses of the growth e¤ects of integration not convincing. 2 Moreover, it sheds light on the conditions under which protection is or is not bene…cial and thus clari…es important issues in the debate on the "new protectionism" that trade models based on increasing returns seem to underpin intellectually.
Second, the e¤ects of incremental liberalization are di¤erent from those of a move from autarky to free trade. According to Forslid (1999, 2000) , this is a property shared by most trade models based on imperfect competition that stems from the fact that incremental trade liberalization has non-linear e¤ects (see also Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991b). My results point out that, in fact, the relation between protection and the number of goods is not just non-linear but discontinuous in that autarky is not the limit of the trade model for a tari¤ that goes to in…nity. This discontinuity is embedded in models of product variety because these models 2 Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a), for example, base their analysis on …rst-generation models of endogenous growth where increasing returns apply at the aggregate level. This property implies that the economy's growth rate increases linearly with its labor endowment (population size). Recent research has shown that this linear scale e¤ect is empirically false (see, e.g., Backus, Kehoe and Kehoe 1992, Jones 1995, Dinopoulos and Thompson 1999), it is not an unavoidable feature of endogenous growth models and, more importantly, is produced by extreme assumptions on the di¤usion and application of knowledge that are not convincing (for recent reviews of this line of work, see Jones 1999, Aghion and Howitt 1998, and Peretto and Smulders 1999).
by construction let consumers have access to all goods. This means that a reduction of trade frictions a¤ects the quantity of each foreign good that domestic consumers buy but does not a¤ect the wedge between the number of goods produced domestically and the number of goods that are available to domestic consumers. A comparison of autarky to trade, in contrast, focuses by construction on the wedge between goods produced domestically and goods available to consumers. This paper studies issues that are notoriously complex. To keep the analysis tractable, I focus on the e¤ects of integration among identical countries. As a result, I work with a model of intra-industry trade in the tradition of Helpman and Krugman (1985) and ignore the e¤ects that derive from comparative advantage when technologies, preferences, and endowments di¤er. 3 Speci…cally, I model a world economy characterized by global oligopolists that produce di¤erentiated goods, engage in worldwide Bertrand price competition and establish in-house R&D facilities to produce, over time, a constant ‡ow of incremental, cost-reducing innovations. Welfare in the typical country depends on the level and growth of consumption and on the variety of consumption goods. The e¤ects of integration depend on what changes in market structure it generates in the global economy. 4 The seminal work on the topic is that of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a Romer ( , 1991b . Their analysis is based on …rst-generation models of endogenous growth whereby the bene…ts of integration stem from an implausibly large scale e¤ect. My model does not su¤er from this ‡aw. In fact, with an endogenous number of …rms, it is almost "natural" to predict that larger 3 One can look at industrial restructuring in two ways. In two-sector models of interindustry trade, entry/exit is driven by a specialization e¤ect: as a country specializes in one sector, there is entry of …rms to that sector and exit from the other sector. In one-sector models of intra-industry trade, in contrast, entry/exit is driven purely by a scale e¤ect: as a country trades with another, the market becomes larger and induces entry/exit of …rms. Specialization and scale e¤ects are not independent. In two-sector models of inter-industry trade, specialization a¤ects market structure within each sector precisely because it changes the relative and absolute size of the two sectors and thereby triggers entry/exit within each sector. In one-sector models of intra-industry trade, the inter-industry specialization e¤ect is absent and what is left is the pure scale e¤ect based on market size. 4 Like in all models of market structure and trade based on increasing returns, the pattern of intra-industry specialization (which country produces which good) is not determined (see, e.g., Helpman and Krugman 1985) . However, this pattern is irrelevant for the main results of the paper because all product lines are identical and preferences are symmetric over all goods. Since the aggregate performance of a country does not depend on its specialization, specifying some process that determines which country produces which good would only complicate the presentation without adding insight. economies do not grow faster but pursue a larger variety of innovation paths. Moreover, I provide results on welfare, which they ignore. Finally, I predict a monotonically decreasing or hump-shaped relation between protection and worldwide growth whereas they predict a U-shaped one.
Recent papers that are more directly comparable to the present one are Smulders and van de Klundert (1995), Wacziarg (1997) , Forslid (1999, 2000) , and Piermartini (1999). Smulders and van de Klundert do not focus on the e¤ects of integration but o¤er some conclusions based on a simple extrapolation of a closed-economy model. Wacziarg has no endogenous growth. His analysis therefore cannot o¤er insights on the growth e¤ects of integration beyond the transitional e¤ects due to capital accumulation. Moreover, his focus on a small, open economy eliminates the global general equilibrium e¤ects that drive my results. Baldwin and Forslid introduce incremental trade liberalization and generalize the analysis of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991b) by introducing procompetitive e¤ects in the research sector captured by an exogenous parameter. The main di¤erences between their work and what I do are that they have atomistic research …rms, and thus rule out procompetitive e¤ects that stem from endogenous mark-ups that vary with the number of …rms, and work with a straightforward extension of …rst-generation endogenous growth models that exhibits the linear scale e¤ect that I criticized above. Of all these papers, Piermartini comes closer to my work. She considers inter-industry and intra-industry e¤ects of incremental integration due to a reduction of iceberg transport costs. The main di¤erences are that I work with a simpler model, compare a reduction in tari¤s to a move from autarky to trade, and provide a global (as opposed to local) characterization of the e¤ects of tari¤s.
These papers are complementary to the present one. The general lesson of this line of work is that when the interactions generated by the endogenous market structure are taken into account, the evaluation of the growth and welfare e¤ects of integration is qualitatively di¤erent from what one …nds in the context of traditional exogenous growth models or …rst-generation endogenous growth models.
I proceed as follows. In section 2, I present the basic closed-economy model that in section 3 I generalize to the case of trade restricted by advalorem import tari¤s. In section 4, I show how a move from autarky to free trade improves growth and welfare. In section 5, I study the e¤ects of a global reduction in tari¤s. In Section 6, I compare the two exercises and discuss the di¤erences in the results that they yield.
2 The basics: preferences, technology and equilibrium concept
Consider an economy with a …xed population, L, of identical consumers each endowed with one unit of labor. I abstract from labor-leisure decisions so that labor supply is L. Consumers have symmetric preferences over differentiated goods supplied by oligopolistic manufacturing …rms. Each …rm supplies one good. Price-setting …rms maximize the present value of profits subject to their demand schedules. This guarantees that supply equals demand in the goods market. Labor and capital market clearing determine the economy's general equilibrium.
Preferences
The typical consumer maximizes lifetime utility
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint that the present discounted value of expenditure cannot be greater than the present discounted value of labor income plus initial wealth,
where ½ is the individual discount rate, E is per capita consumption expenditure, B is the individual's assets holding, and W´1 is the wage rate, which I take as the numeraire. 5 C is a consumption index de…ned as
where ² is the elasticity of product substitution, C i is the consumer's purchase of each di¤erentiated good, and N is the number of goods.
As is well known, in this framework consumers set
5 The model can be solved using a standard utility function with constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Restricting attention to logarithmic utility, however, simpli…es the analysis. and, taking as given this time-path of expenditure, maximize (2) subject to
where X i = LC i .
Technology
Each …rm produces output with the technology
where X i is the …rm's output and L X i is the …rm's labor employment in production. There are …xed (and sunk) overhead costs Á. The …rm undertakes R&D in order to accumulate cost-reducing innovations that are patented. Z i is the …rm's patent stock. Technological opportunity conditions are described by two functions. The function Z µ i states that labor productivity rises with the accumulated patent stock. The function
states that the …rm generates _ Z i new patents in the interval of time dt by allocating L Z i units of labor to R&D. Patents contain knowledge that is not innovation-speci…c and is not appropriable. This implies that a …rm's R&D produces knowledge that can be exploited by other …rms. The parameter°d etermines the fraction of knowledge that becomes public. The productivity of labor in R&D, K i , is a weighted average of the …rm's own knowledge and spillovers from the other …rms. N is the number of …rms, which is determined endogenously by the equilibrium conditions of the industry.
(6) exhibits constant returns to scale to knowledge that sustain constant endogenous growth in steady state. Spillovers imply increasing returns to the number of …rms. The degree to which these apply depends on the interaction of knowledge specialization and R&D replication. Firms produce differentiated products and develop specialized technologies. They thus learn from their similarities as well as from their di¤erences in the sense that the knowledge produced by one …rm bene…ts the R&D e¤ort of another …rm according to how close they are in technology space and how little they replicate each others' R&D. I summarize these factors with the assumption that the weights assigned to spillovers of knowledge from the other …rms are symmetric and decreasing in the number of …rms. The …rst is a simplifying assumption that preserves the overall symmetry of the model; the second captures the notion that "idea congestion" increases with the number of …rms in the industry. 6 The parameter ± determines how quickly congestion sets in and increasing returns to the number of …rms vanish. To see this, notice that in symmetric equilibrium
where …rm-level variables without subscripts denote industry averages. This expression exhibits positive, diminishing returns to the number of …rms N that are bounded from above.
Market structure in general equilibrium
The market equilibrium of the economy sketched above has three building blocks. First, value maximization determines the price and investment strategies of active …rms. Next, entry/exit decisions determine the number of active …rms. Finally, these two results combined with labor and market clearing conditions determine the general equilibrium of the economy. The typical …rm maximizes the present discounted value of net cash ‡ow,
Instantaneous pro…ts are
where L X i is total production costs and L Z i is R&D expenditure. With perfect foresight, V i is the stock market value of the …rm. Peretto (1996 Peretto ( , 1998 provides a formal de…nition of the Nash equilibrium with free entry/exit for this setup. In words, the Nash equilibrium requires that each …rm chooses time-paths of price and R&D investment that maximize V i and that such maximized value be driven to zero by entry/exit. The Nash equilibrium can thus be described as the outcome of the interaction between two relationships. One represents the optimal R&D strategy of …rms given the number of …rms; the other represents the number of …rms that the market supports in zero-pro…t equilibrium given that …rms play the optimal R&D strategy. By construction, these relationships incorporate conditions that the capital and labor markets clear. The advantage of this setup is that it reduces the determination of the economy's general equilibrium to the determination of the equilibrium of its manufacturing sector and allows me to concentrate on the role of market structure. In the next section, I adapt this structure to a model of international trade where global oligopolists sell di¤erentiated goods in all countries.
The trade model with import tari¤s
There are c identical countries. Let N k be the number of domestic …rms in country k. Let M = P c k=1 N k be the global number of …rms. All countries charge an ad-valorem tari¤ ¿ on foreign goods. The part of the model that describes producers and consumers does not change with the exception that now the number of goods in (2) and the number of …rms in (6) is the global number of …rms (domestic and foreign). In other words, the typical consumer in the typical country consumes all available goods while the typical producer draws spillovers from all …rms. This turns out to be important.
Preliminaries
Most of my results depend on the structure of demand and its implications for the pricing behavior of …rms. It is useful to emphasize this aspect of the model from the outset. Formally, (2) and (6) are modi…ed as follows:
The …rst equation posits that the typical consumer likes all goods symmetrically. The second posits that the …rm draws spillovers from the global population of …rms and that spillovers from domestic and foreign …rms get the same weight.
In country k, consumers maximize (7) subject to
where C ik is consumption of good i produced in country k, C is is consumption of good i imported from country s, P ik is the price of good i produced in country k and P is is the price of good i imported from country s. The price index of consumption goods in country k is
Solving the optimization problem, one …nds that consumers demand goods according to the following schedule:
The …rst equation is the demand for good i when good i is produced domestically, the second is the demand for good i when good i is imported. Using these results, the total demand faced by …rm i in country k can be written
where X D ik and X F ik denote, respectively, the …rm's domestic and foreign sales and P s is the price index of consumption goods in country s.
Lemma 1
The demand schedule (9) yields the following price elasticity of demand for a global price-setting oligopolist:
Proof. De…ne the following two variables:
The …rst is …rm i's share of its domestic market, the second is …rm i's share of any foreign market. After a little algebra -and taking into account that because of the tari¤ …rm i has a di¤erent e¤ect on the price index of its home country and the price index of a foreign country -I obtain
Symmetry across countries allows me to write
This expression says that the global market power of …rm i is a weighted average of its market power in its domestic market and in all foreign markets in which it operates. Symmetry across …rms allows me to write the market shares as:
Symmetry across countries also implies M = cN. The price elasticity of demand that results from these expressions is given in (10) . Notice that
The expression for the price elasticity of demand summarizes the e¤ect of trade barriers on market competition: it is monotonically decreasing in the tari¤, meaning that trade barriers raise the market power of domestic producers in their own market. All my results stem from the e¤ect of the tari¤ on market power as captured by this elasticity.
Market structure in the global economy
It is useful to characterize the general equilibrium of the global economy in three steps. First, I solve for the equilibrium number of …rms. Next, I evaluate growth at the equilibrium number of …rms. Finally, I evaluate welfare.
Proposition 2
The following equation determines the number of domestic …rms in the general equilibrium of the global economy where the global industry is in symmetric Nash equilibrium with free entry/exit, all domestic labor markets clear, and the global capital market clears:
where the price elasticity of demand » (cN) is given by (10) and
is the productivity of R&D. The number of domestic …rms is monotonically increasing in the tari¤.
Proof. Since countries are identical, I can normalize the wage in each one and have a common numeraire. Firm i in country k maximizes V ik subject to (5), (8) , (9) , Z ik (t) = Z > 0 (initial knowledge is given), Z js (¿ ) for ¿¸t given for all j 6 = i and for all s (the …rm takes as given the rivals' knowledge paths), and _ Z ik (¿ )¸0 for ¿¸t (knowledge accumulation is irreversible). I assume that …rms take their R&D productivity, K ik , as given; allowing …rms to internalize the e¤ect of their own knowledge on their R&D productivity does not change the qualitative results of the paper. Suppose now that …rms …nance R&D by issuing ownership claims on the ‡ow of pro…ts generated by cost-reducing innovations. Let the market value of such …nancial assets be q ik . A …rm is willing to undertake R&D if the value of the innovation is equal to its cost,
Since the innovation is implemented in-house, its bene…ts are determined by the marginal pro…t it generates. Thus, the return to the innovation must satisfy the arbitrage condition
Using (5) and the demand curve (9), the …rm's pro…t is
Hence,
This expression must be evaluated at the optimal pricing strategy. This is the mark-up rule
where » ik is the price elasticity of demand that the …rm faces. Solving (14) for Z ¡µ ik and substituting into marginal pro…t, I get
Taking logs and time derivatives of (12), substituting into (13) and rearranging terms yields
which de…nes the rate of return to innovation. I now consider entry/exit decisions. I assume that the cost of entry/exit is zero, existing …rms do not have scrap value, and the value of not being active is zero. Hence, the number of …rms is a jumping variable and an equilibrium with free entry/exit exists if V ik = 0. Stock prices must satisfy the arbitrage condition
Multiplying by V ik = 0, observing that the left-hand-side is zero for any value of the interest rate, and realizing that _ V ik = 0, the arbitrage condition yields the traditional zero-pro…t condition, ¦ ik = 0, which reads
This equation states that …rms break even in the sense that their cash ‡ow just covers …xed management and R&D costs.
Assuming µ(²¡1) < 1, symmetry of this Nash equilibrium can be proved as in Peretto (1998, Proposition 1). Let variables without …rm subscripts denote industry averages. I obtain:
where » is the price elasticity of demand, ® is the productivity of R&D, and L Z is R&D expenditure per …rm. Notice now that the zero-pro…t condition can also be written P ik X ik = L X ik +L Z ik . Using this expression, in each country the labor market clearing
Using the expressions for the market shares, I can then solve for
Expenditure is hump-shaped in ¿ because it depends on tari¤ revenues. The income e¤ect of a higher tari¤ is positive as long as tari¤ revenues are increasing in ¿ . The solution for the optimal intertemporal expenditure plan yields the saving schedule (3), which yields r = ½ since (17) says that E is a constant. 7
Using the expressions for the market shares and expenditure, treating the number of …rms as a continuous variable, taking logs and time-derivatives of K, and observing that _ Z Z = ®L Z , I now use (15) and (16) to obtain
This di¤erential equation has a unique saddle-point steady state, which means that the economy is at all times on its balanced growth path with a constant number of …rms determined by (NN trade ). Given that » is decreasing in ¿ , an increase in the tari¤ raises the right-hand side of the equation and causes N to rise. Since M = cN , the global number of …rms rises as well.
Since these expressions are equal, the condition is satis…ed. Second, it must be that the combination of zero pro…t, labor market clearing and balanced trade yield the output market clearing condition that aggregate income be equal to aggregate expenditure, L + T = LE, where T is tari¤ revenues. To prove that this is the case, notice that
On the left there is aggregate income, on the right aggregate spending. Since pro…ts are zero, the symmetric model has L + T = LE:
The following terms play a central role in the analysis. The term
is the gross-pro…t e¤ect. It has two components: the …rst is a scale e¤ect captured by total sales per …rm, L N ; the second is a mark-up e¤ect captured by the pro…t margin, 1 » . The term µ(» ¡ 1) is the business-stealing e¤ect and captures the fact that by undertaking cost-reducing R&D the …rm is able to o¤er lower prices and expand its market share. The gross-pro…t and business-stealing e¤ects capture the market interaction of …rms. The term ® captures the spillover e¤ect that stems from the technological interaction of …rms: given R&D spending per …rm, growth is higher when spillovers are stronger.
Growth
It is useful to de…ne economic growth formally. In symmetric equilibrium all …rms advance at the same pace. Moreover, in each country per capita consumption expenditure, E, and the number of domestic …rms, N, are constant. Under these conditions, the rate of cost reduction,
determines the rate of growth of output, which is equal to the rate of growth of consumption. Notice now that (15) yields the following R&D strategy of the …rm
Solving (16) for L »N , substituting the resulting expression into this equation, and using the de…nition of g, I obtain
To interpret this equation, consider the two steps that I took to construct it. First, each …rm takes the number of …rms as given and solves an intertemporal optimization problem that yields the optimal price and R&D strategy. The symmetry of the model and the general equilibrium conditions imply that this strategy can be written as a function that maps the number of …rms into the …rm's optimal level of R&D spending which, in turn, yields the rate of growth. Given the number of …rms, this equation describes the Nash equilibrium of the oligopoly game that is the …rst building block of the model. Of course, the number of …rms is endogenous and must be determined by the zero-pro…t condition. In its usual interpretation, this equation determines the number of …rms given that they undertake the optimal level of R&D spending. The second step in the construction of the GG locus is thus to substitute the zero-pro…t condition into the equilibrium R&D strategy obtained in the …rst step. The result is a modi…ed version of the equilibrium R&D strategy that takes into account the fact that …rms have perfect foresight about the e¤ects of a parameter change on the zeropro…t condition and correctly anticipate entry/exit. Figure 1 illustrates the resulting equilibrium.
There exists a critical value of the number of …rms, N 0 , such that growth is positive only if there are more than N 0 domestic …rms in the market, which means that there are overall cN 0 …rms in the global economy. Whenever growth is positive, moreover, it is increasing in the number of domestic …rms although it is bounded from above. This turns out to be an important property. As population size, L, increases, the number of domestic …rms, N , increases. Hence, the rate of growth of the global economy is an increasing function of population size that is bounded from above. In other words, the scale e¤ect is positive but eventually vanishes (see Peretto and Smulders 1999 for a general discussion of this property in this class of models). The economic mechanism is the following. The larger population of the typical country generates a larger global market that raises …rms' gross pro…ts (this is the gross-pro…t e¤ect). This attracts entry, raises competition and induces …rms to spend more on R&D (this is the business-stealing e¤ect). However, as the number of …rms becomes large, the positive e¤ect of the larger market on the incentives to undertake R&D is fully o¤set by the fact that entry reduces the gross pro…t that …rms earn on their innovations. Thus, when population is very large, a further increase in population size has no e¤ect on the growth rate while it has a large e¤ect on the number of …rms. 8 
Welfare
In symmetric equilibrium, the consumption index (7), the demand curve (9) and the price policy (14) yield log C = log (cN)
Substituting into (1) and integrating yields
The terms log (cN ) ² ²¡1 and log
»´c apture the fact that utility is increasing in the number of consumption goods and the quantity of each consumption good; the term g ½ captures the fact that utility is increasing in the rate of growth of consumption. Using (GG trade ), I can write
This is the equivalent of the GG locus in (N; U ) space. When the global industry equilibrium supports zero growth, utility is increasing in the number of …rms because this yields a larger variety of consumption goods. Moreover, as the number of …rms increases, the price elasticity of demand, », increases, prices fall, and consumption increases. As the number of …rms reaches the critical level N 0 and …rms start spending on R&D, entry leads to faster growth thus realizing further utility gains. One can use this locus to determine welfare at the market equilibrium by taking the equilibrium number of …rms that obtains from (NN trade ) and substituting it into (U U trade ). 9 4 Autarky versus free trade Two de…nitions of autarky are possible in the context of this paper. One is that autarky entails no trade and no ‡ows of knowledge. The other is that autarky entails no trade while ‡ows of knowledge are allowed. In the former case, one obtains autarky simply by setting c = 1 in (NN trade ), (GG trade ) and (U U trade ). In the latter, one sets c = 1 in (N N trade ), (GG trade ) and (U U trade ) but leaves (11) unchanged. The two approaches produce similar results. I discuss only the …rst one. 10 9 In the typical country, I look at a population of identical individuals at one point in time. If integration yields higher utility, it yields a Pareto improvement because it makes everybody better-o¤. Further welfare gains might be achieved by implementing policies that move the economy to the Pareto optimal allocation. These, however, are beyond the scope of the paper. 10 One could argue that this characterization of autarky is very restrictive because it implies that knowledge spillovers are embedded in trade ‡ows. To the extent that knowledge is disembodied and intangible, an autarchic country with zero trade ‡ows could enjoy positive spillovers from the rest of the world. This speci…cation, however, does not change the qualitative results of the paper in a substantial way. I am indebted to Peter Thompson for pointing out this aspect of the model. The equations that characterize the general equilibrium of the autarchic economy where the industry is in symmetric Nash equilibrium with free entry/exit and all markets clear are as follows:
where
is the price elasticity of demand and
is the productivity of R&D. Comparing (GG trade ) and (U U trade ) to (GG autarky ) and (U U autarky ), one notices the following di¤erences. First, the price elasticity of demand is given by (10) , which is larger than (18) for all N . Second, spillovers are given by (11) , which is larger than (19) for all N . Third, in (U U trade ) there is the extra term 1 ²¡1 log c, which captures the fact that trade allows access to a larger variety of goods.
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As a result, (GG trade ) and (U U trade ) are everywhere above (U U autarky ) and (GG autarky ). Figure 1 illustrates the market equilibrium of the global economy in comparison to the market equilibrium of the autarchic economy. Let N ¤ be the equilibrium number of domestic …rms in autarky. A move from autarky to trade -free or restricted by tari¤s -corresponds to an exogenous increase in the price elasticity of demand, », and R&D productivity, ®, for all levels of the number of domestic …rms, N. That is, the terms »(N) and ®(N) are replaced by »(cN ) and ®(cN ). Alternatively, it takes the form of a change in the number of …rms from N to M = cN that preserves the shape of the functions »(¢) and ®(¢). As it is apparent from the …gure, the e¤ects of such a move are potentially ambiguous because the number of domestic …rms falls. I can, however, resolve the ambiguity and obtain sharp predictions. To do so, I …rst compare autarky to free trade and then look at the incremental e¤ects of the tari¤ rate.
Let N ¤¤ be the equilibrium number of domestic …rms in free trade. Figure 2 and the following two propositions characterize the di¤erences between autarky and free trade.
Proposition 3
The global number of …rms in free trade is larger than the number of domestic …rms in autarky, which is larger than the number of domestic …rms in free trade,
Proof. By de…nition, N ¤ and N ¤¤ are such that:
The right-hand side of these equations is decreasing in N , » (¢) and ® (¢).
Comparing the two equations, one sees that for a given N integration raises » (¢) and ® (¢). Hence, N ¤¤ < N ¤ . Now replace cN ¤¤ with M ¤¤ in the second equation to obtain
The right-hand side of this expression is decreasing in M. Comparing (20) and (22), one sees that the e¤ect of free trade is to multiply L by c while the shape of » (¢) and ® (¢) is preserved. It follows that
Inspection of (21) shows the forces behind the fall in the number of domestic …rms. First, there is a negative gross-pro…t e¤ect because the higher price elasticity of demand reduces mark-ups and market shares. Second, there is a positive business-stealing e¤ect that induces higher R&D spending and reduces the number of …rms that the market supports in zero-pro…t equilibrium. Third, the stronger spillovers raise R&D productivity and induce higher R&D spending, which further reduces the number of …rms. Thus, domestic …rms are squeezed out by a combination of falling cash ‡ow and escalating R&D spending. This illustrates the crucial property of the model: a move from autarky to free trade leads to exit of domestic producers while domestic consumers gain access to foreign goods and the surviving domestic producers gain access to foreign knowledge. This change in market structure is bene…cial.
Proposition 4 Growth and welfare in autarky are lower than in free trade.
Proof. Consider (GG trade ) and (U U trade ), set ¿ = 0, and replace cN with M. This yields:
Now notice that these equations have the same shape as (N N autarky ) and (U U autarky ). Hence, to compare growth and welfare in autarky and free trade one simply needs to evaluate them at, respectively, N ¤ and M
¤¤
. Since both equations are increasing in their arguments, g ¤¤ > g ¤ and U ¤¤ > U ¤ .
The proof of this proposition -parhaps not surprisingly -emphasizes that the growth and welfare gains due to a move from autarky to free trade stem from the increase in the number of …rms that operate in each market. 12 It is the increase in competition, together with the increase in the variety of goods and sources of knowledge spillovers, that drives the faster growth and higher lifetime utility attained in free trade. 12 A move from autarky to free trade entails global exit in the sense that the global number of …rms falls. In a world where all countries are autarchic there are cN ¤ …rms, while in a world with free trade there are cN ¤¤ …rms. Since N ¤ > N ¤¤ , the global number of …rms in a world of free trade is lower than in an autarchic world.
An important aspect of this result is that the scale e¤ect behind it -the relation between the growth rate and the size of the market -is non-linear. For economies that do not support growth in autarky, integration produces the conditions for positive growth if the number of integrating countries is su¢ciently large. Consider, for example, an economy with fundamentals such that N ¤ < N 0 , which yields g (N ¤ ) = 0. It is always possible to …nd a number of trading partners su¢ciently large so that g (cN ¤¤ ) > 0. This threshold-crossing e¤ect is due to the property that the scale e¤ect is stronger the smaller the economy. Notice, moreover, that this scale e¤ect does not run from the country's population to its growth rate because the country does not have access to foreign labor and thus its resources endowment is unchanged. This means that the positive growth e¤ect of integration is due to the …rm's access to a larger, more competitive market where larger means that the number of customers is larger (a demand side e¤ect), not the number of workers (a supply side e¤ect). Finally, the growth e¤ect of integration is bounded from above. It is large for small economies with much market power and is negligible for large economies that approach monopolistic competition where the price elasticity of demand approaches the upper bound ² and spillovers approach the upper bound°+ ±°.
The e¤ects of a global reduction in tari¤s
At this point, one should notice the importance of my characterization of the international economy as a global, di¤erentiated oligopoly. In the literature on market structure and trade it is customary to posit monopolistic competition -as opposed to deriving it as the limit of the oligopoly model when the number of …rms becomes very large -by assuming that there is a continuum of goods. With such an assumption, the price elasticity of demand faced by …rms is always ² regardless of the tari¤. Inspection of (NN trade ) then reveals that a global reduction in tari¤s has no e¤ects. One way to recover e¤ects of the tari¤ is to reformulate the model by allowing for non tradeable goods. A global reduction in tari¤s then leads to an expansion of the tradeable sector with respect to the untreadable one. Such e¤ects, however, do not stem from changes in market structure within industries. This points out that the model that I set up in this paper succesfully isolates the e¤ects of tari¤s on competition in international oligopolies. 13 Figure 3 illustrates the e¤ects of a global reduction in tari¤s. The GG locus shifts up because the higher price elasticity of demand raises the incentives to engage in cost reducing R&D. The number of domestic …rms, on the other hand, is smaller and this entails a movement down along the GG locus. As a result, the growth e¤ect is ambiguous. The intuition is as follows. When ¿ decreases, …rms experience tougher price competition; this raises the business stealing e¤ect and induces them to rise R&D spending. The direct e¤ect of lower tari¤s is thus to boost growth. However, the fall in the number of domestic …rms, which corresponds to a fall in the global number of …rms, reduces global competition in the sense that in each market in which the …rm sells it faces fewer rivals. This reduces the business-stealing e¤ect and induces …rms to reduce R&D. In addition, spillovers are weaker. Hence, the indirect e¤ect of lower tari¤s tends to reduce growth. A similar story applies to welfare. The U U locus shifts up because lower tari¤s raise price competition. Holding constant the number of domestic …rms, this lowers the mark-ups that …rms charge and this allows consumers to buy larger quantities of goods. Moreover, the stronger business-stealing e¤ect induces …rms to speed up growth. However, because some …rms go out of business, the variety of consumption goods and of sources of spillovers falls and this has a negative e¤ect on welfare and a negative e¤ect on growth, which has a further negative e¤ect on welfare. These forces show up as a movement down along the new, higher U U locus.
Overall, there is a tension between the bene…ts of product and knowledge variety that tari¤s protect and the costs of smaller …rm size that leads to less exploitation of economies of scale. In other words, there is a tension between external and internal increasing returns. Tari¤s raise the number of …rms and thus foster external economies -love of variety for consumers and technological spillovers for producers. On the other hand, the larger number of …rms prevents the individual …rm from fully realizing internal economies of scale due to …xed management costs and dynamic increasing returns in R&D. I refer to the e¤ects of a reduction in tari¤s as the homogenization and rationalization e¤ects. It is important to notice that the homogenization e¤ect described here is opposite to the diversity e¤ect (Helpman and Krugman 1985, p. 264 ) that drives the welfare gains that countries realize when moving from autarky to free trade. This discussion "proves" the following proposition. So far I have focused on the local e¤ects of the tari¤. I now look at its global e¤ects. To this end, the following limiting results help.
The right-hand side of (23) is smaller than that of (NN autarky ) for all
. Now replace N with M c to obtain
Comparing (NN autarky ) and (24), one sees that the two equations di¤er by the term c that multiplies L in (24) and by the fact that the expression for the price elasticity of demand is lower in (24) . As a result, the right-hand side of (24) is larger than the right-hand side of (N N autarky ) for all N and M. Since the two expressions are decresing in, respectively, N and M, one obtains N ¤ < M 1 = cN 1 . The inequality N ¤¤ < N 1 follows from the fact that for all N the price elasticity of demand is larger in (21) than in (23) . One can now follow the logic of proposition 4 to show that g ¤ < g 1 and U ¤ < U 1 . Finally, notice that g
The last inequality is true because Á® > ½ and » (N ¤¤ ) > » (N 1 ).
If one recalls that the number of domestic …rms is monotonically increasing in the tari¤, these limiting results allow one to conclude that for all values of the tari¤ the number of domestic …rms and the global number of …rms are, respectively, smaller and larger than the number of domestic …rms in autarky. In other words, autarky yields the largest number of domestic producers and the smallest number of available goods, that is, the smallest number of …rms operating in the domestic market. This provides the intuition behind the next result: trade dominates autarky for all values of the tari¤ in the sense that growth and welfare are always higher. The reason is that, regardless of the value of the tari¤, trade allows a country to consume a larger variety of goods than it produces while the larger number of …rms generates tougher competition and stronger spillovers that support faster growth. Finally, the limiting result that g ¤¤ > g 1 allows one to conclude that the relation between growth and the tari¤ is at most hump-shapedgrowth could be increasing for small values of the tari¤ but eventually must be decreasing in the tari¤. In fact, inspection of (GG trade ) suggests that growth is monotonically decreasing in the tari¤ if the direct e¤ect of the tari¤ on the price elasticity of demand dominates the indirect e¤ect,
This su¢cient condition is likely to hold in reality. Unfortunately, I do not have a similar result for welfare because of the extra term 1 ²¡1 log (cN ) in (U U trade ), which also does not allow me to prove that U ¤¤ > U 1 . In other words, the relation between welfare and the tari¤ could be monotonically increasing. This, however, would require implausibly strong external increasing returns. Overall, the model suggests that the relations between growth and welfare and the tari¤ are either monotonically decreasing or hump-shaped. Figure 4 illustrates my conclusions. 14 Figure 5 provides a graphical comparison of the two exercises undertaken in the previous sections. Starting from free trade, ¿ = 0, and increasing ¿ , the GG locus in (N; g) space shifts down, re ‡ecting the fact that protection reduces competition and thus induces …rms to cut R&D spending. The number of …rms, on the other hand, rises, re ‡ecting the fact that protection makes domestic …rms more pro…table and thus attracts entry. For ¿ = 1, the equilibrium is at the intersection of the dashed lines, (N 1 ; g 1 ), which is not autarky. Only if one posits that spillovers in autarky are ® (cN) -re ‡ecting the fact that ‡ows of intangible knowledge are not embedded in 14 These results establish an important di¤erence between my work and the contributions of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991b) and Forslid (1999, 2000) who obtain Ushaped relationships between the ad-valorem tari¤ and growth. First, in their models the tari¤ a¤ects only a …rm's level of sales in foreign markets and not the markup of price over marginal cost. Second, the number of …rms is …xed so that there is no additional feedback due to the endogenous structure of the market. The second channel is most important. If I assume that the number of …rms is …xed, I obtain that growth increases linearly with population size and decreases monotonically with the tari¤. The latter result stems purely from the direct e¤ect of the tari¤ on the price elasticity of demand since this version of the model shuts down the possibly o¤setting indirect e¤ect. trade ‡ows so that domestic …rms bene…t from foreign knowledge even if there is no trade -the equilibrium for an in…nite tari¤ is at the autarky point (N ¤ ; g ¤ ).
Understanding the di¤erences
In (N; U ) space, there is a wedge between the (U U autarky ) and (U U trade ) loci due to the fact that consumers have acces to the entire menu of goods produced in the world for all possible levels of the tari¤. Hence, even if one posits that spillovers in autarky are ® (cN), the relation M = cN prevents the U U locus to converge to the one that applies in autarky. There is thus a crucial di¤erence between the exercise that compares autarky to free trade and the exercise that looks at an incremental reduction in tari¤s. 15 Where does this di¤erence come from? In the case of a global reduction in tari¤s, there cannot be entry of foreign …rms in the domestic market because all …rms operate in all markets to begin with. Hence, the only e¤ect that the model can capture is the loss of market power of domestic …rms due to lower tari¤s with the consequent fall in net pro…ts that squeezes out some …rms. As a consequence, looking at an incremental trade liberalization gives a di¤erent answer from comparing autarky to trade.
Consider …rst the experiment discussed in Section 4. When the economy is opened to trade, each …rm faces a market where the number of customers and the number of competing …rms have increased in the same proportion, so that sales per …rm do not change, but where tougher competition reduces …rms' market power and yields lower mark-ups and pro…t margins. As a result, in each country the domestic number of …rms falls. From the viewpoint of the consumer, however, exit of domestic producers is more then compensated by entry of foreign …rms that are now free to export to the consumer's country. More generally, integration produces a major change in industrial market structure: the integrated market is larger and concentration is lower. The important result is that …rms in a larger, more competitive market spend more on R&D -which is also more productive because spillovers are stronger -so that growth is faster. Welfare increases because the global number of …rms in the integrated market is larger than the number of domestic …rms in autarky, while tougher competition forces …rms to charge lower mark-ups and prices. 16 Interestingly, and intuitively, 15 I emphasize that this property does not depend on my de…nition of autarky as a situation where knowledge spillovers across countries are zero. Rather, it follows from the property of the CES preferences that the marginal utility of each good is in…nity for a quantity that approaches zero. This means that domestic consumers buy all foreign goods even if the tari¤ is very large so that the e¤ect of the tari¤ is absorbed by the quantitiy of each good, not by the number of goods. 16 Recall that prices fall over time because of falling costs: the statement compares prices this mechanism is at work also in the case of a move from autarky to trade restricted by tari¤s. Hence, one can conclude:
Summary 7 A move from autarky to trade -free or restricted by advalorem tari¤s -raises growth and welfare because it generates a larger, more competitive market where producers have access to a larger number of customers and a larger body of knowledge spillovers, while consumers have access to a larger variety of cheaper goods. Hence, the quantity, variety and growth of consumption rise.
Consider now the experiment discussed in Section 5. The competitive e¤ect of integration reduces …rms' market power and yields lower markups and pro…t margins. The crucial result is that the global number of …rms falls. The consumer now sees exit of domestic and foreign …rms. Integration, therefore, leads to a market that is of the same size -because the number of customers has not changed -while concentration is higher. There is thus a tension between the e¤ect of the lost protection in the domestic market and the e¤ect of the larger share of the global market that each …rm now commands. On the other hand, spillovers are now weaker because some sources of knowledge are lost due to exit. In principle, the growth e¤ect is ambiguous. Similarly, the welfare e¤ect is ambiguous because the variety of consumption goods is smaller while, partially compensating this, …rms have less market power and charge lower mark-ups. I have been able to show that the relation between growth and the tari¤ is either decreasing or hump-shaped. Under reasonable conditions, the relation between welfare and the tari¤ exhibits a similar property. One can thus conclude: Summary 8 A global reduction in tari¤s triggers a trade-o¤ between internal and external economies of scale. The variety of sources of knowledge spillovers and of consumption goods falls. This homogenization e¤ect tends to reduce growth and welfare. On the other hand, …rms become larger while tougher competition induces them to reduce mark-ups, which allows consumers to buy larger quantities of the available goods, and raise R&D spending. This rationalization e¤ect tends to raise growth and welfare. The balance of these forces is such that growth and welfare generally increase with the reduction in tari¤s except at su¢ciently low values of the tari¤ where it is possible that they decrease.
These experiments suggest that to determine whether "integration lets countries exploit increasing returns in R&D" one needs …rst to specify the at two di¤erent equilibria, not at di¤erent moments in time.
form of integration and, more importantly, to be very clear about the setup. The …rst experiment produces results that match conventional intuition on the bene…ts of international trade: larger markets, more competition, more choice. This is because by construction one is looking at a shock that entails an increase in the number of …rms that serve domestic consumers. The second experiment shuts down this channel. In so doing, it focuses attention on the opposite extreme where the shock entails a reduction of the number of …rms that serve domestic consumers. In other words, the results for the case of incremental liberalization depend crucially on the property that the wedge between the number of domestic producers and the number of goods available to consumers does not depend on the tari¤ because the relation M = cN holds. This means that N and M are constrained to move in the same direction and thus from the viewpoint of the domestic consumer exit of domestic …rms is bound to yield exit of domestic and foreign …rms. As a result, the growth and welfare e¤ects of integration depend on the relative importance of increasing returns internal to the …rm and increasing returns external to the …rm. A global reduction in tari¤s is bene…cial when the love of variety e¤ect is weak and technological spillovers do not change much with the number of …rms. To some extent, these results also match conventional intuition expressed in complaints like "globalization is making the world more homogeneous" that it is common to hear today.
Conclusion
I discussed the role of economic integration in a model of endogenous growth where the size of the …rm and the interactions between growth and the endogenous structure of the market play a crucial role. In contrast to previous work based on …rst-generation models of endogenous innovation (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1991, Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991a, 1991b, and Forslid 1999, 2000) , I focused on a model of Schumpeterian innovation undertaken in-house and characterized by partial knowledge spillovers. This allowed me to analyze the e¤ects of integration on competition, R&D activity, and ultimately on growth and welfare in a world economy populated by global oligopolists.
I provided a characterization of the conditions under which integration improves growth and welfare. To summarize, a move from autarky to trade -even if trade is restricted by tari¤s -raises growth and welfare because it generates a larger, more competitive market where …rms have access to a larger body of technological spillovers. A global reduction in tari¤s has potentially ambiguous growth and welfare e¤ects because there is a trade-o¤ between internal and external economies of scale. Growth and welfare rise if the rationalization e¤ect dominates the homogenization e¤ect.
I have discussed the reason why looking at an incremental trade liberalization gives a di¤erent answer from comparing autarky to trade. An interesting direction for future research is to develop a model that reconciles these di¤erent perspectives. Such a model should have the property that the wedge between the number of goods produced domestically and the number of goods consumed be a function of trade policy. To my knowledge there is no model with this property in the literature.
